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In the philosophy of mind, the causal relationship between phenomenal 
consciousness, mentation and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the 
one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain-epiphenomena. 
One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on the premise that because a cerebral 
impairment, or its anatomical and biochemical modification, leads to a cognitive 
impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-
brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard 
consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity 
pointing at the ineffable and undefinable seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective 
qualitative experience and its related mental dimension. Here, we argue that the premise 
of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy and will review 
some neuroscientific and biological findings that question the idea that posits 
phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity. While these (mostly 
ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast 
into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate 
equally well, if not even more effectively, an ontology that posits mind and 
consciousness as a primal phenomenon. 
Keywords Philosophy of mind · Mind-body problem · Neuroscience · Material 
monism · Physicalism · Dualism · Idealism 
Introduction 
Since the times of René Descartes in the 17th century, the mind-body problem has been one of the 
central debates in the philosophy of mind. The conventional Cartesian dualism is no longer considered 
tenable but other forms of dualism, or theoretical frameworks of philosophical idealism, or more 
generally, non-physicalist ontologies, state that mind and consciousness cannot be explained as mere 
epiphenomena of neural processes. 
Dualism is opposed by an identity theory, which, instead, considers mind and consciousness as 
nothing other than emergent epiphenomena arising from the collective interaction of the neuronal 
activity in the brain. There is only matter with its processes determined by the laws of physics and no 
immaterial mind or consciousness is considered an unnecessary hypothesis.  
Dualists and monists have different schools of thought but, despite the variety of opinions, it is fair 
to say that most scientists and philosophers consider themselves to be material monists. 
However, there is now a growing awareness that a mere functional investigation will not answer 
questions of a more philosophical nature. The belief that the progress of modern neurosciences would 
soon shed light on David Chalmer’s notorious ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (Chalmers, 2015) has 
turned out to be much too optimistic. This is because, unlike other physical processes, in which causes 
and effects can both be observed from a third-person perspective, in consciousness studies one is 
confronted with a cause–the brain activity–that one can still analyze from a third-person perspective 
that, however, apparently produces an effect we call ‘conscious experience’, or just ‘sentience’, which 
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can be apprehended only from a first-person perspective. This ‘perspectival asymmetry’ makes 
consciousness in its subjective and experiential dimension stand out as a phenomenon alien to any 
attempt of conceptual causal and ontological scientific reduction. Inside a naturalistic framework, the 
origin and ontology of the phenomenal subjective conscious experience remain unclear. 
While most arguments were based mainly on a philosophical line of reasoning, we will show that 
there are also empiric facts that have not received sufficient appreciation and that give us good reasons 
to look upon the physicalist assumptions with a more critical eye.  
We will first examine more closely the logical framework that sustains a mechanistic conception by 
pointing out some conventional causation-correlation fallacies. Then, a review of old and new 
neuroscientific findings will illustrate the weaknesses of a mind-consciousness-brain identity theory and 
that ask for clarification if one wants to save the orthodox physicalist paradigm. A section will focus on 
the emergent fields of the study of plant and cellular ‘basal cognition.’ Conclusive remarks will follow. 
I. Neurological causation-correlation fallacies 
Let us first question some basic assumptions. Does the physical change of a brain state leading to 
cognitive impairment or altered states of consciousness provide logical proof that mind and 
consciousness are an epiphenomenon of the brain? 
After all, it is undeniable that there is a direct relation between the physical state of our brains and 
our subjective experiences. Dopamine is a neurotransmitter molecule that enables biochemical 
transmission among neurons and which is responsible for the effects of a drug like cocaine. We know 
that psychedelic drugs can lead to intense subjective effects. It is a well-known fact that brain damage 
can lead to severe cognitive impairments. If the Broca's area, a left cerebral hemisphere area, is 
disrupted, one loses the ability to speak (interestingly, however, not the ability to comprehend language). 
Someone being anesthetized using anesthetic drugs (seemingly) 'loses' consciousness. And nowadays, 
we have a whole bunch of sophisticated brain scan technologies that make it clear, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, how for every conscious experience, there exists a neural correlate in our brains.  
 Thus, apparently, no place is left for any form of dualism. Mind seems to emerge from matter; there 
is no distinction. Our personalities, identities, moods, and states of consciousness seem to depend on the 
biophysical state of our brains. 
And yet, few further critical thoughts should make it clear that such a correlation is not a sufficiency 
criterion. One has to secure one’s theoretical framework from a possible logical fallacy which believes 
that correlation implies causation. The fact that two events are always coincidental or always happen 
shortly, one after the other, doesn't imply that the first event caused the second event to happen. If from 
A follows B we are not entitled to conclude that the cause of B is A. These sorts of logical fallacies are 
known as 'post-hoc fallacies'. 
Nevertheless, the mind-body identification, which links the neural activity as the cause of conscious 
experience, is the almost unquestioned working premise based on an even subtler level of conflation 
between correlation and causation. It also escapes to well-trained scientists because it is not of a 
statistical nature; rather, it is of a more conceptual and philosophical nature that can easily escape 
attention especially if there is an unaware confirmation bias at work with the (more or less subconscious) 
desire that some data or empiric evidence supports our beliefs and fits in our worldview. 
The habit of correlating neural states and mental states, as the former being the efficient cause of the 
latter, betrays an unreflective attitude that scientists would not allow in other contexts. Aim of the present 
article is not that to defend some particular metaphysical theory rather that to point out that also other 
possible ways of interpreting the neurological and biological findings are possible and might have even 
more explanatory power.  
But, what are the alternatives to the mind-body identification that, nevertheless, could be in line with 
the above correlation between mental states and physical neural correlates of consciousness?  
In fact, the metaphor most idealists prefer is the 'filter theory of consciousness,' which dates back to 
an original idea of William James, who stated: "My thesis is now this: that, when we think of the law 
that thought is a function of the brain, we are not required to think of productive function only; we are 
entitled also to consider permissive or transmissive function. And the ordinary psycho-physiologist 
leaves this out of his account” (emphasis in the original text) (James, 1898). James thought of the brain 
and consciousness as the prism separating white light into colored beams, respectively. If a broken prism 
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fails in its function to 'reveal' the colored light beams, this should not induce us into the logical fallacy 
that the prism 'produces' colored light. It is just an object with a transmissive function; it doesn't 
'generate' anything. 
Aldous Huxley expressed a similar idea and proposed that the brain is a 'reducing valve' of what he 
called a 'Mind at large,' a universal or cosmic Mind that comprises all of reality with all ideas and all 
thoughts. According to Huxley our mind filters reality under normal conditions because, otherwise, we 
would be overwhelmed by the knowledge of this universal Mind. Psychedelic drugs can remove the 
filter and bring us into contact with the Mind at large, leading to the experiences that several mystics 
describe. In his words: "To make survival possible biologically, Mind at large has to be funneled through 
the reducing valve of the brain and nervous system" (Huxley, 1954). 
For Huxley the brain was a material 'connecting device', an 'interface' or 'relay station'. 
Going beyond these analogies, how does this concretely relate to the states of consciousness and our 
brain states? For example, a flash of light on your eye retina triggers a chemical reaction in the visual 
cortex, but nobody would argue from that that light is just chemistry in the brain. Or, with transcranial 
electrical stimulation of the visual cortex, one can also induce the perception of flashes of light 
('phosphenes') (Kohitij & Krekelberg, 2012). It is even possible to induce the visual perception of 
luminous shapes, such as letter shapes in blind people (Yoshor & al., 2018). And, after all, we all know 
well that we might be seeing stars or light flashes like lightnings, just by pressuring or rubbing our eyes 
(an effect known as 'photopsia'). But nobody would reduce the existence of real stars, lightnings, or the 
letters you are reading, only to an epiphenomenon of the brain on the base of neural correlates ignoring 
its external stimulus, otherwise one would fall into a post-hoc fallacy. 
So, neural correlates of consciousness do not prove or dismiss much. We can equally well sustain 
the contrary hypothesis: Consciousness, mental states, and emotional states determine the physical state 
of a brain, not the other way around. The brain could equally well be seen as a physical substrate through 
which these conscious states manifest without incurring in any contradiction with the observations. 
Of course, these analogies don't provide evidence for the opposite claim either, but they make it clear 
how careful we must be about jumping to physical or metaphysical conclusions driven by our unaware 
assumptions. 
II. The search for the ‘seat of consciousness’ 
There is no evidence, not even indirect or circumstantial, of a single brain region, area, organ, 
anatomical feature, or Cartesian pineal gland that takes charge of this mysterious job of ‘producing’ or 
‘generating’ consciousness. Most of the brain is busy processing sensory inputs, motor tasks, and 
automatic and sub- or unconscious physiological regulation. 
In fact, neural activity alone cannot be a sufficient condition to lead to a subjective phenomenal 
experience. Most of the brain’s workings do not lead to qualitative experiences. Since the vast majority 
of things a brain does are unconscious (such as the heartbeat, breathing, the 
control of blood pressure and temperature, motor control, etc.), this raises the 
question: What distinguishes a neural process that leads to a conscious 
experience from that which does not? 
 For example, the cerebellum is almost exclusively dedicated to motor 
control functions, and its impairment leads to equilibrium and movement 
disorders. However, it does not affect one’s state of consciousness. Its role in 
‘generating’ experience seems to be marginal, if any. There are also rare cases 
of people who live without cerebellum (a clinical condition known as 
‘cerebellar agenesis’) and have only mild or moderate motor deficits or other 
types of disorders (Feng & al., 2105). This is a fact that seemingly 
confirms the brain’s proverbial neuro-plasticity, which we will see next 
through other extraordinary examples. 
It may be worth recalling that the neuronal architecture in our bodies 
is not confined in the brain — that is, it goes far beyond our heads, 
through the brain stem, and down through the spinal cord. The central 
nervous system is made up of the brain and the spinal cord. The latter is responsible for the transmission 
of nerve signals from and to the motor cortex, and as is well known, injuries can result in paralysis. But, 
Fig. 1 Case of cerebellar agenesis: 
Living (and walking)  
without the cerebellum.  
Credit: (Feng & al., 2105). 
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again, no cognitive deficit or state of consciousness is altered by impairments of the spinal cord. This 
leaves only one option: If there is a ‘seat of consciousness,’ it must be identified somewhere in the 
cerebral cortex or subcortical areas of the brain.  
Another interesting example of how the correlation-causation fallacy conditions scientific and 
popular understanding of the mind-body problem can be illustrated by an interesting experimental 
finding in 2020 by a group of scientists from the department of psychology at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. They showed how stimulation of the thalamus arouses macaques from stable 
anesthesia (Redinbaugh & al., 2020). The awake, sleeping and anesthetized states could be aroused with 
the stimulation of the central lateral thalamus. The straightforward conclusion seemed to be clear. The 
ultimate origin and switch ‘modulating’ consciousness was discovered. If your consciousness ‘depends’ 
on the state of your thalamus, just by ‘switching’ it on and off by pushing a button, then the thalamus 
must be the ‘seat of consciousness.’ What else is there to think about?  
First of all, regarding from a third-person perspective the absence of an external physiological 
signature as evidence for a lack of an internal first-person sentience is yet another causation-correlation 
fallacy that has too frequently led to unwarranted conclusions. For example, if anesthesia induces an 
unconscious state with the patient having no whatsoever subjective experience is far from obvious. We 
simply don’t know if it really induces a completely unconscious state or a conscious but non-
metacognitive no-report state that makes one unable to recall past experiences once back in the waking 
state. In fact, some evidence suggests that anesthetic-induced unresponsiveness does not induce 
complete disconnectedness (Anon., 2018) (Radek, 2018). Interestingly in this regard is also the so-called 
twilight anesthesia, an anesthetic technique that sedates patients only mildly and induces amnesia but 
no loss of consciousness (Scheinin & al., 2020). During this 'twilight state,' they are responsive and can 
be asked to perform some tasks that they would not be able to recollect after the surgery. This case alone 
shows that the inability to recall events during sedation is no proof of unconsciousness. 
Moreover, there is now a non-negligible amount of scientific literature that presents empiric evidence 
on parasomnia (sleepwalking), hypnosis, non-REM sleep and on subjects in a vegetative state that some 
form of conscious awareness is present also in all these non-responsive states of consciousness (e.g. 
(Oudiette & al., 2009), (Siclari et al., 2018), (Owen & Coleman, 2006), (Cruse & al., 2011) (Mackenzie, 
2019).) Arguing and extrapolating from the lack of superficial physical cues and mnemonic retention to 
a verdict which declares someone to be ‘unconscious’–that is, having no subjective phenomenal 
experience–is, at least philosophically, a simplistic and unreflective intellectual attitude. 
But even if we assume that there is no internal experience when we are anesthetized, the relevant 
question remains whether these sorts of experimental findings confirm that the thalamus is the ‘seat of 
consciousness.’ Is it a sort of modern replacement for Descartes’ pineal gland in its mechanistic-material 
monist version? 
The thalamus is responsible for sensory information processing. It is known that its main job is to 
function as a relay and feedback station between sensory brain areas and the cerebral cortex. For 
example, it functions as a hub between the optical nerves that transport the visual information coming 
from our eye retinas to the visual cortex located in the posterior part of the brain. Even if one would 
remain conscious by turning down the functionality of the thalamus, one would no longer see anything 
because the neural pathways between the retina and the visual cortex are interrupted. From that, 
however, nobody would conclude that the thalamus is the seat of the visual experience for which the 
visual cortex is responsible. 
In the end, these findings don’t tell us much about the generation of conscious experience. 
However, if there is not one single ‘seat of consciousness,’ could it be that the combination and 
activity of some or all the different brain areas do ‘produce’ the subjective experience? 
In fact, one of the persisting myths is the idea that specific parts of the brain are dedicated to a 
particular psychological or organic function. But nowadays, we have sufficient evidence that must 
compel us to abandon this simplistic view of a compartmentalized brain. There is no brain region doing 
only one thing, and there are no neurons supposedly having only one function. Most neurons have 
several jobs, not a single purpose. It turns out that whenever we hear a sound, have a visual experience, 
have feelings or emotions, or perform some motoric task, the whole brain is involved. Even such an 
apparently highly specialized brain region as the primary visual cortex carries out information processes 
related to hearing, touch, and movement (Liang & al., 2013) (Merabet & al., 2008). The reason why we 
nevertheless tend to associate specific brain regions with specific cognitive, sensorial, or motoric 
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functions is that brain scans show only a temporal snapshot of the brain’s most intense activity. We are 
seeing only a few ‘tips of the iceberg’ and missing the overall activity in the noise. When studies are 
conducted using less noisy but much more expensive and complicated detection methods, most of the 
brain's activity becomes visible (Gonzalez-Castill & al., 2012). 
Thus, it would seem plausible that if consciousness arises from the activity of a complex aggregation 
of neurons, one could conjecture that to ‘generate’ consciousness, at least some brain areas must work 
together in a unified whole via thalamic activity. From this perspective, the thalamus function is to 
‘integrate’ the information flow of the several brain areas and, if disrupted, consequently lead to a ‘loss’ 
of consciousness. 
This, however, would also suggest that if someone were to 
split your brain into two parts, and you survived, you would 
presumably feel somewhat less conscious and less ‘yourself.’ 
As well-known this is a very real surgical procedure 
performed since the 1940s: the corpus callosotomy (although 
only rarely used nowadays). It is a performed only to treat the 
worst cases of epilepsy (patients having up to 30 seizures a 
day) that did not respond to any medical treatment. In this 
procedure, the corpus callosum, the nerve tract connecting the 
left and right brain hemispheres, is severed (in part or, in some 
cases, entirely cut through), thereby avoiding the spread of 
epileptic activity between the two halves of the brain. Its 
natural function is to ensure communication between the two 
cerebral cortexes of the two hemispheres to integrate and coordinate motor, sensory, and cognitive 
functions, such as moving left and right limbs, the visual integration of the left and right sight, etc. 
Because most of the brain’s activity is distributed on both hemispheres, with no indication of one or the 
other part being responsible for generating our sense of ‘self’ one must wonder how the patients who 
have gone through such an acute surgical intervention feel. Do their split brains ‘generate’ a dual 
consciousness and split personality? 
Contrary to common belief, also among neuroscientist, facts have shown that these patients do not 
have any symptoms of multiple personalities or display any signs of internal dissociation after surgery. 
Their self, mind, and conscious experience remain a unified whole of one subject and individuality. 
They deny being a different person from what they were before surgery. Close relatives who knew the 
split-brain patients before and after surgery, didn't notice any change in personality. 
Of course, there can be more or less severe drawbacks. In some cases, the so-called ‘alien-hand 
syndrome’ can take over, where one hand appears to have a mind of its own. This occasionally happens 
when the two hemispheres’ representations of reality come into conflict, and one wants to override the 
other. In these instances, decision-making and volition between the two hemispheres clash. An example 
is the patient‘s struggle to overcome an antagonistic behavior, such as knowing what cloth they want to 
wear, while one of their hands takes control and reaches out for another cloth they don’t want at all. 
However, this should not be confused with two personalities competing against each other (like in the 
case of dissociative identity disorders), as the split-brain patients identify with only one body and 
perceive their disobedient limb as being subjected to annoying motoric misbehavior; they do not report 
any sensation of some other internal personality taking control. The brain — or, more precisely, our two 
brains — tell us two different ‘stories’. Split-brain patients seem to identify with one of the stories — 
that is, consciously access one of its interpretations — and keep the other in a subconscious or subliminal 
awareness, what the American cognitive neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga used to call the ‘left-brain 
interpreter.’ 
Recent investigations also question the canonical textbook findings (Pinto & al., 2017) (Pinto & al., 
2020). While it is confirmed that a corpus callosotomy splits the visual perception of the environment 
in two, several patients can nevertheless see them both and report it to the outside world — that is, they 
can access their language centers. Moreover, there is no evidence for memory loss. Their perceptions 
are unified in consciousness with no sign of dual consciousness with two independent perceivers. The 
confusion surrounding the split-brain psychology arises, only if we conflate mind with consciousness 
and the sense of selfhood. If we don’t confuse mental states as being the origin or efficient cause for 
consciousness, then any apparent paradox dissipates. Split-brainers may have two (eventually even 
Fig. 2 Does brain-splitting cause ‘self-splitting’? 
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conflicting) hemispheric and motor-sensory mental states (something not entirely unusual in healthy 
subjects too) but, even if one argues and provides evidence for a ‘two-minds’ model, that wouldn’t imply 
a split sense of identity or self-awareness. 
These findings also challenge the theories of consciousness, such as the 'Global Workspace Theory' 
of Bernard J. Baars (Baars, 1988) and the ‘Integrated Information Theory’ of consciousness of Giulio 
Tononi ( (Oizumi et al., 2014) (Tononi, 2015)) since they rely on a model of memory and information 
distributed throughout the brain.  
To save the paradigm, the materialists point out that in not all documented cases was a complete 
transection of the corpus callosum performed. The truth, however, is that in several cases, the complete 
sectioning was performed and was even confirmed by MRI imaging or radiological means (Gazzaniga, 
1985). Then, they point out that a complete transection still leaves some residual subcortical structures 
(the brain structures below the surface cerebral cortex) intact, which allows for some communication 
between the two hemispheres, potentially maintaining the ‘self’ of the patients. 
To further substantiate the contrary hypothesis, we could also mention 
that, to treat epilepsy, the most extreme surgical intervention is to remove an 
entire brain hemisphere, that is, by hemispherectomy. Usually, this is done 
only in childhood because, supposedly, young brains can rewire themselves 
much more efficiently than older ones. Fig. 3 shows a scan of the brain of an 
adult who had an entire hemisphere removed during childhood because of 
epilepsy (Klienmann & al., 2019). 
However, Nature seems to not take the left/right distinction and early 
plasticity hypothesis too seriously. That the left-right brain task distribution 
is not an inescapable neurological dogma is testified by people born with only 
one hemisphere. For example, while in healthy subjects the left 
visual field is represented in the right hemisphere and vice versa, 
someone born with only one hemisphere can develop maps of both 
visual fields in it. (Muckli & al., 2009) Hemispherectomy on adults 
older than 18 years turns out to be safe and effective as in early childhood (McGovern & al., 2019). 
Even in the case of a left hemispherectomy, the language center — which in normal conditions, is in the 
left hemisphere — can be recovered  in the right part of the brain (Vargha-Khadem & al., 1997). 
A possible explanation is that because these patients already had severe seizures originating in one 
of the hemispheres, the functional rewiring on the other hemisphere began before the surgery. The 
findings tend to disconfirm this easy way out. Though interconnectivity inside the brain networks 
increased, the interconnectivity between brain regions with the same function after hemispherectomy 
does not differ from that of two hemispheric control subjects (Klienmann & al., 2019). That plasticity 
alone can explain this state of affairs is far from proven. For example, definitive evidence for functional 
remapping after stroke remains lacking. (Zeiger, 2021) 
However it is, most patients become seizure-free, and their cognition is relatively unchanged after 
surgery (some motoric and cognitive functions decrease, but others improve). Overall, these patients 
appear to be ‘normal.’ Before and after surgery, there is no substantial change in IQ scores, and in 
everyday life, one could not tell the difference between humans having a brain or only half of one. No 
whatsoever ‘half-self’, ‘half-awareness,’ or ‘half-consciousness’ is reported by the subjects.  
Worth a reminder is how, in 1980, the British pediatrician John Lorber reported that some adults 
cured of childhood hydrocephaly had no more than 5% volume of brain tissue and a cerebral cortex as 
thin as 1mm (Lewin, 1980). While some had cognitive and perceptual disorders, and several developed 
epilepsy, others were surprisingly asymptomatic and even of above-average intelligence.  
Then, in 2007, in Marseille, France, a 44-year-old man 
complaining of weakness in his left leg was submitted to 
an MRI brain scan (Feuillet & al., 2007). As Fig. 4 shows, 
the skull is abnormally filled with cerebrospinal fluid, 
leaving only a thin sheet of actual brain tissue. As an 
infant, he had a shunt inserted into his head to drain the 
fluid, but it was removed at the age of 14. Evidently, the 
cerebrospinal fluid build-up didn't stop and ended up Fig. 4 MRI image of a hydrocephalus brain. 
Credit: (Feuillet & al., 2007). 
Fig. 3 Hemispherectomy. Living (quite 
well) with only half of the brain. 
Credit: (Klienmann & al., 2019) 
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reducing the brain’s size to 50-75% compared to its normal volume. Though he had a below-average IQ 
(75/100), this man had a job, a family, and a normal life. 
All these findings also confirm that brain size and the numbers of neurons in a brain do not (or, at 
least, do not necessarily) make up one’s intelligence. Size matters for manipulative complexity, such as 
the more complex hand movements in primates, which humans can develop superbly (think of the hands 
of an expert musician playing piano) (Heldstab & al., 2020). But a direct correlation between brain size 
and mental skills is not that straightforward. We like to believe that it is our brain size that makes us 
human but rarely do we question what one means by ‘size’. The number of neurons? The weight of the 
brain? Its brain to body ratio? Or its volume? Humans don’t have the largest brain size in any of the 
aforementioned senses. The human brain has about 90 billion neurons, weights ca. 1.1 to 1.4 kg and has 
a volume of 1300 cm3. But the brain of an elephant has three times the number of neurons we have, and 
the weight and volume of the brain of a sperm whale are six times as much and ants have a six times 
larger brain to body mass ratio. A bit of an extreme example that shows how cognitive skills and brain 
size are decoupled is the case of mouse lemurs that have a brain that is 1/200th the size of monkeys' but 
perform equally well on a primate intelligence test (Fichtel et al., 2020). Therefore, brain size alone is 
not what makes up a more developed mind. Then what does? 
It is plausible to assume that a certain degree of complexity is a mandatory factor for a brain or 
whatever material structure to display a form of intelligence and cognitive skills. One could think of a 
measure of ‘brain connectivity’ — that is, the number of wirings between neurons (through their axons, 
dendrites, and synapses) and the speed at which they transmit and receive signals — as an indicator of 
its complexity and see if it somehow scales with the cognitive functionality. However, MRI studies 
reveal that all mammals, including humans, share equal brain overall connectivity (Assaf & al., 2020). 
The efficiency of information transfer through the neural network in a human is comparable to that of a 
mouse. It is independent of the structure or size of the brain and does not vary from species to species. 
So, things can’t be as easy as that. 
Several neurologists or cognitive scientists conjecture that phenomenal consciousness resides in the 
cerebral cortex. 
This belief isn’t unproblematic. First of all, since the neocortex exists only in humans and other 
mammals, one must conclude that birds, fish, octopuses, amphibians, and reptiles are, per definition, all 
'unconscious' and incapable of having some, more or less elementary form of conscious subjective 
experience. There is no sentience; they don't feel pain, fear, or pleasure or have whatever feeling. They 
are considered Cartesian automatons or philosophical zombies. 
But evidence is beginning to emerge that, for example, the neural correlate patterns of sensory 
consciousness in a corvid bird aren’t substantially different from the neural correlates in humans having 
a similar sensory conscious subjective experience (Nieder et al., 2020). Moreover, one wonders how 
some birds can also perform amazing cognitive feats despite their forebrains consisting of lumps of grey 
cells. It turns out that cortex-like circuits in avian birds exist that are reminiscent of the mammalian 
forebrains, and the idea that advanced cognitive skills are possible only because of the evolution of the 
highly complex cerebral cortex in mammals is becoming less plausible (Stacho & al., 2020). There is 
sufficiently strong evidence to conclude that both cephalopods and crustaceans are sentient (Cox & al, 
2021). After all, this is unsurprising: Common sense doesn’t really need any scientific proof to accept 
that ravens, crows, octopuses or lobsters are sentient beings. 
Another example that should raise doubts is the cases of children in a developmental vegetative state 
— that is, what is officially considered by the American Academy of Neurology (as declared in its 
guideline report in 1995 and confirmed in 2018) as being a neurovegetative state in which there is “no 
evidence of purposeful behavior suggesting awareness of self or environment” (Nuerology, 2018). In 
other words: a universal rule that reduces them to unconscious children who cannot suffer because this 
supposedly requires a functioning cerebral cortex. 
Nevertheless, only one case that shows the contrary should be sufficient to disprove a universal rule. 
Four such cases were brought to light in 1999 by a group of pediatric neurologists at the University of 
California, led by D. Alan Shewmoon (Shewmon et al., 1999). They studied the states of awareness in 
congenitally decorticate children — that is, the cases of four children who were almost completely 
lacking the cortical tissue and were neurologically certified as being in a vegetative state. Yet, the loving 
care of their mothers (or of someone who adopted them and bonded with them via dedicated full-time 
caring) could gradually ‘awaken’ in them a conscious awareness. From an initially unresponsive state, 
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they showed clear signs of having developed auditory perception and visual awareness (despite the total 
absence of the occipital lobe that, in normal conditions, hosts the visual areas). For example, they tracked 
faces and toys, looked after persons they recognized and could distinguish from their mothers or 
caretakers, listened to music for which they manifested preferences with their facial expressions, 
including smiling and crying, and, at least in one case, gave clear indications of self-recognition in a 
mirror. Shewmoon notes: “Were they [the decorticate children] not humans studied by clinicians but 
rather animals studied by ethologists, no one would object to attributing to them ‘consciousness’ (or 
ability to ‘experience’ pain or suffering) based on their evident adaptive interaction with the 
environment.”  
These cases seem to contradict the prevailing theory according to which the cerebral cortex generates 
consciousness. However, one can still point out that the children were not completely decorticated, as 
some cortical tissue was still left (for, example, Fig. 5 shows that a remnant of the frontal lobe is still 
present) possibly producing conscious awareness. 
 
Fig. 5 Congenitally decorticate children MRI brain scan (midline sagittal and posterior coronal plane).  
 Credit: (Shewmon et al., 1999) 
If so, one wonders why they are considered in an unconscious vegetative state in the first place. And 
the fact that consciousness does not require the cerebral cortex was later questioned by other findings 
(Merker, 2007). Despite this compelling evidence, the conviction that consciousness is ‘produced,’ 
‘generated,’ or ‘created’ by the cerebral cortex and that someone having only subcortical brain tissue 
must be ‘unconscious’ remains a pervasive belief. 
Other speculations, instead, now retire to the last cerebral bastion for the seat of consciousness: the 
brainstem (Solms & Panksepp, 2012). Indeed, its stimulation can also trigger intense emotions and 
feelings. But one wonders what mysterious property a neural circuitry dedicated to the most physical 
and basal control of cardiac, respiratory, and homeostatic functions, containing mainly neurons for 
motor and sensory tasks, is also able to give rise to such an apparently immaterial and completely 
different and unrelated ‘function’ or ‘property’ as a conscious experience. 
Overall, with the exception of congenitally decorticate children, the cases mentioned above of people 
who have undergone corpus callosotomy or hemispherectomy, or people suffering from hydrocephalus, 
cerebellar agenesis, or several other types of brain damage, show how surprisingly intact their higher 
cognitive function remains. One would expect that the first victims of such invasive neurological 
changes or surgical interventions would be those complex and high-demanding cognitive functions so 
characteristic of the mind, such as intellectual skills, abstract thinking, decision-making, reason, 
logically and willfully planning actions, and so on. Instead, it turns out that even if large brain masses 
are injured or absent, the cognitive skills of the subject remain substantially unaltered.  
All these findings require an explanation from the physicalist viewpoint, which identifies the mind 
with the brain. Of course, one could resort to the usual conjecture that neural plasticity explains all 
things. In principle, it can always be invoked, like a magic wand, to save appearances. But some caution 
would be appropriate. For example, a recent study challenges the idea of adaptive circuit plasticity 
according to which the brain recruits existing neurons to take over for those that are lost from stroke. 
Undamaged neurons do not change their function after a stroke to compensate for damaged ones, as the 
conventional re-mapping hypothesis believed (Zeiger & al, 2021). 
The question is also why sensory or motoric functions are much more prone to be disrupted than 
mental ones. The IQ and abstract thinking of these subjects seem not to be affected (for a review of the 
discrepancy between cerebral structure and cognitive functioning see (Nahm et al., 2017). These recent 
findings confirm what was already known from the studies of the American neurosurgeon Wilder 
Penfield. His surgical specialty was the mapping of seizure foci by stimulating the brain regions of 
locally anesthetized but awake patients. Observing the patient’s response, he was able to show how 
different brain electrical stimulations would cause a seizure or evoke a sensation, a perception, a 
movement of muscles, a memory, or even a vivid emotion but, interestingly, never evoked or inhibited 
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thinking (Penfield, 1975). The normal reasoning functions, those of mind, intellectual skills, and rational 
analytic thought, were never affected by whatever stimulation. From a third-person perspective, thought 
can seemingly be switched off entirely by triggering a seizure or by anesthesia, but it can’t be weakened 
or enforced by weakening or enforcing the activity of any brain area. 
Furthermore, if the human’s analytic and rational functions are a mere cerebral product, one would 
expect to find some observable difference between the ordinary brain of someone with a low IQ and 
that of a genius like Einstein. In fact, Einstein’s brain was removed after his death and has been 
conserved until nowadays for analysis to find some cerebral signature that could account for his 
extraordinary intellectual achievements. Yet, nothing relevant was found, and Einstein’s genius remains 
a mystery. More recently, a study evidenced that his corpus callosum was thicker than average, 
indicating that the connectivity between the two hemispheres of Einstein’s brain was generally enhanced 
compared to other ‘normal’ brains (Men & al., 2014). But, if the connectivity between brain hemispheres 
accounts for someone’s intelligence, this immediately raises the question, again, in light of what we 
have discussed above: Why does a corpus callosotomy or hemispherectomy not lead to a loss of IQ or 
no substantial psychological and behavioral change? 
One might also question if, besides the spatial distribution or localization of the neural correlates of 
consciousness, the intensity of its metabolic activity might also play a role in generating a conscious 
experience. For example, it is well known how drugs can change our brain chemistry and give rise to 
subjective psychedelic experiences. 
From the perspective of the material monist, which equates mind and brain as being one and the same 
thing, one assumes that the intensity of ‘mind-expanding’ psychedelics must be directly proportional to 
an increase in neural activity and connectivity. However, the contrary turned out to be the case. A 
BOLD-fMRI study reported a significant decrease of brain activity — that is, a decreased blood flow 
and venous oxygenation in the default mode network (a highly interconnected large scale network in the 
brain) — as being inversely proportional to the intensity of the subjective experience reported by the 
test subjects (Robert & et al., 2012). The authors of this research pointed out how this is consistent with 
Aldous Huxley’s ‘reducing valve’ metaphor in the brain that acts to limit our perceptions in an ordinary 
state of consciousness. These findings were later confirmed by further studies with other hallucinogenic 
drugs such as LSD and ayahuasca (Palhano-Fontes & et al., 2015), (Robin, 2016), (Lewis, 2017). The 
materialistic viewpoint can be saved, however, by other evidence that shows how the default mode 
network is more active during our conscious attention to external things, while another network, the so-
called dorsal attention network, is activated during an introspective and internally directed attention 
(Huang & al., 2020). It is, therefore, natural to see the former becoming more ‘quiet’ and disconnected 
when the subject is having intense internal subjective experiences. If so, it tells us only that different 
anti-correlated networks are activated during the waking consciousness when there is external or internal 
attention, respectively, and that this anti-correlation fades away under anesthesia or unresponsive states. 
We should not forget that consciousness is subjected to the effects of organic activity in several 
bodily regions, not only in the brain. By ‘organic activity,’ we mean not only neuronal activity but, in 
general, any biological process. In fact, mounting evidence shows how our consciousness is, if not 
‘generated,’ at least ‘modulated’ by other parts of the body. 
For example, gut microbes (microbiota) influence our cognition, emotional state, and memory. There 
is a relationship between them and pathological states, such as anxiety, mood disorders, or 
developmental disorders such as autism. The amount and diversity of microorganisms inhabiting our 
intestines affect how we think, perceive, and experience the world (Hooks et al., 2018). This is 
physiological evidence that suggests how our emotional states cannot be reduced to only a brain-centric 
view but arise due to a complex interaction between the brain and the rest of the body (Colombetti & 
Zavala, 2019). Moreover, it is a widely accepted fact that a sort of enteric brain exists — that is, a 
nervous system of neurons that governs the function of the gastrointestinal tract independent of the brain, 
the spinal cord, and the brain stem. If we assume that emotions are ‘generated’ by the limbic system 
because, for example, changes in the structure of the amygdala ‘elicit’ mood and anxiety disorders, why 
can’t we say the same for our gut, as its microbiota ‘generate’ similar effects? If we don’t consider our 
guts the seat of consciousness that’s because, besides the unappetizing idea, none of its physiological 
change induces ‘unconscious’ states. 
Of course, we can stick with the brain-centric model and reshuffle everything into a gut-brain axis 
according to which the gut microbiome influences the brain, with the brain remaining the ultimate source 
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of conscious experience. In fact, communication pathways between the gut microbiome and the brain 
exist, reassuring the dominant paradigm. But as science advances, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
distinguish between causes and effects while maintaining the brain as a separate central master-organ, 
with all other organs and physiological processes subservient. This view is challenged by recent findings 
which suggest taking a perspective that considers the body as a whole — that is, a vastly more complex 
ecosystem of molecules, microbes, and neurons distributed throughout the entire body rather than in 
only a 1.5 kg clump of gray matter in our skulls (Colombetti & Zavala, 2019), (Bastiaanssen & al., 
2019). We inadvertently reduce the whole to one of its parts and, paradoxically, consider that part as the 
ultimate cause and sufficiency for the process of the whole — say, for example, like regarding digestion 
as being driven entirely by the processes taking place only in the stomach, considering it the cause and 
sufficiency for digestion itself.1 This is essentially what we do when considering the brain as the ultimate 
causal and sufficient center for the processes of mind and consciousness. 
Aside from phenomenal consciousness, there remain other aspects to be explained which escapes  a 
materialistic paradigm with a strikingly similar pattern: the neural correlates of memory. Also, in this 
case, one thing is sure: Memory is not stored in a specific brain area like it is on a digital computer. 
More than a century of research for the engram cells — that is, the group of neurons supposedly 
responsible for the physical representation of memory — has not led to tangible results providing 
convincing evidence that such cells really exist.  
On the one hand, it appears that some brain regions are more involved in memory consolidation than 
others. For example, the hippocampus, a part of the limbic system, seems to play a significant role in 
memorization. In the amygdala, emotional memories play a role, such as the remembrance of fearful 
events. Motor events are stored in the cerebellum, while the prefrontal cortex is responsible for higher-
cognitive memorization tasks, such as storing words and semantic content. Neurotransmitters must also 
be fundamental in memory formation because they are responsible for the communication among 
neurons determining its synaptic strength. But, overall, the real physical, cerebral memorization 
mechanism continues to remain elusive, and there is still no credible theory explaining where and how 
experiences are memorized at a neural level. 
Again, one may argue that facts show how damaging the hippocampus leads to a short-memory loss, 
especially in object and facial recognition tasks, but this does not affect other types of memories. 
Moreover, a brain stroke or dementia can lead to consistent memory loss. Therefore, everything seems 
to indicate that memory is in the brain. What else? 
This logical memory-brain identification has similar difficulties in terms of standing up to scrutiny 
as the presumed consciousness-brain identity and is highly prone to becoming another correlation-
causation fallacy. What makes us so certain that brain damage causing memory deficits is caused by 
physical impairment of the physical memory content? The only thing that we know is that a brain injury 
can lead to the impossibility of retrieving memory. A failure to retrieve a memory does not necessarily 
imply a memory loss. The inability to recall something does not imply the absence of it. Using an 
analogy: Disconnecting a hard drive from a PC will render its memory content unavailable, but the 
memory is not necessarily affected. Indeed, it is well known that when a brain injury occurs, causing 
some form of amnesia, what was thought to be lost forever may remerge into awareness, sometimes 
after years. This suggests that the disease-specific structural brain changes can’t be so straightforwardly 
associated with the repository of memory. 
From the materialist’s perspective, the information content should somehow scale with the brain size. 
But nothing like this is observed in hydrocephalic individuals or patients who have undergone 
hemispherectomy. How can it be that someone without half of the entire brain has no memory loss? 
Obviously, we can, as usual, explain this away by resorting to the plasticity of the brain or the functions 
of residual brain tissues that might jump in to save the paradigm. Or, we could conjecture that memory 
is stored in both hemispheres; therefore, if one hemisphere goes lost, the other remains nevertheless 
unimpaired (a hypothesis which could also fit well with supposed evolutionary advantages). Or because 
it is always the diseased hemisphere that is removed in all these cases, Nature might have provided for 
a mechanism that transfers the memories to the healthy hemisphere before surgery. However, we should 
be aware that these are conjectures, hypotheses, and speculations, not scientifically established truths. 
 
1 An analogy first suggested by French philosopher Henri Bergson. 
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Memory storage and retrieval in biological brains remains a largely unexplained mechanism, and no 
conclusive evidence exists that proves it to be of physical nature. 
Other research that might suggest how and where memories are stored in brains comes from 
experiments performed on freshwater flatworms called planaria. These creatures can be trained to 
associate an electric shock with a flash of light — that is, they can learn by association that whenever 
they perceive a shock, a light flash will appear shortly thereafter. That they remember and associate the 
electric impulse with the light flash can be shown by the fact that once trained, they will curl their bodies 
whenever the light is flashed, even without the discharge. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they 
must have encoded the experience in their brains.  
However, experiments reveal that things can not be easy as that. Flatworm planarians have an 
incredible self-regeneration ability. If this worm is cut in half, each amputated body part regenerates as 
two new fully formed flatworms. Not only does the part with the head form a new tail, but the remaining 
tail also forms a new head with a brain and eyes. In 1959, James McConnel of the  University of 
Michigan, showed that the newly-formed planaria with a new brain also maintained its conditioned 
behavior. The new-formed living being never received the electric shock and light flash of the training 
phase, and yet it reacted as if it still had a memory of the training it had never received. How could an 
initially headless worm acquire a memory that is supposed to be stored only in the brain of the other 
worm?  
McConnel cut the worms many times more and observed that all the worms retained their memory 
and learned response. This suggests that memories, if physical, may not be stored only in the brain but 
throughout the body, in non-neuronal tissue. 
McConnel’s idea was that RNA molecules could transfer memory from one planarian to another as 
a “memory molecule.” Motivated by this idea, he then injected worms with RNA taken from those 
trained and reported that the training had been transferred. This seemed to support the idea that memories 
are encoded in the RNA structure. 
However, further research could not reproduce McConnel’s experiments convincingly. After a 
period of notoriety, McConnel’s experiments were dismissed and forgotten. 
Until 2013, when Michael Levin and Tal Shomrat of Tufts University vindicated McConnel’s first 
experiments by using a computerized training of planarians, replacing manual procedures that caused 
previous test attempts to fail (Shomrat & Levin, 2013). In 2018, Alexis Bédécarrats from the group led 
by David Glanzman, resurrected McConnel’s idea, showing how the extracted RNA from a long-term 
trained sea slug, the aplysia, can induce sensitization in an untrained aplysia. This is taken as evidence 
for the existence of engrams and the hypothesis that RNA-induced epigenetic changes lead to the protein 
synthesis required to consolidate or inhibit memory. These local translations into synaptic proteins 
determining the neural structure of memory are actually the mainstream engram model. 
 However, the problem with this hypothesis is that the fastest protein synthesis causes cellular 
changes on timescales of minutes. This raises the question: How could it possibly be responsible for our 
ability to store and recall memories almost instantaneously?  
Moreover, Glanzman’s group challenged the idea of memory mapped as synaptic connectivity in the 
brain in previous research, in which they showed that it is possible to erase synaptic connections while 
maintaining the same conditioned behavior in the mollusks. Long-term memory and synaptic changes 
result can, at least in some cases, be dissociated (Chen et al., 2014).  It has also been shown that the 
brain tissue turns over at a rate of 3–4% per day, which implies a complete renewal of the brain tissue 
proteins within 4–5 weeks (Smeets & al., 2018). How then can the memory supposedly internalized in 
that tissue remain intact? 
Similar challenging evidence comes from hibernation. Since animal brains undergoing hibernation 
are subjected to severe changes in structure, one would expect equally severe memory losses. 
Nevertheless, while ground squirrels tend to forget their conditioned tasks after hibernation, they retain 
their social memory. (Millesi & al., 2001) Memory is retained during hibernation in Alpine marmots. 
(Clemens et al., 2009) If memory is encoded in neural networks, bats seem to benefit from an as yet 
unknown neuroprotective mechanism to prevent memory loss after hibernation of their brain. 
(Ruczynski & Siemers, 2011) Memory seems also to be immune from seasonal skull and brain size 
changes, the so called ‘Dehnel's phenomenon’. (Lázaro & al., 2017) Memories formed in the earliest 
embryonic states of frogs survive extensive remodeling of their brains and bodies. (Hepper & Waldman, 
1992) Most impressive is how moths can remember what they learned as a caterpillar (the moth larvae) 
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despite a complete metamorphosis of its brain (Blackiston et al., 2008). During the period of this 
metamorphosis from larvae to moth, most of its brain tissues is literally dissolved into a messy soup–
that is, into their constituent proteins through a process called ‘histolysis’–and later reconstructed into 
that of a moth. Yet memory remains unaffected. How can animals whose brains have been so drastically 
remodelled still recall their past experiences? 
On the top of that, it turns out that neuronal representations and functions gradually ‘drift’ over 
timescales spanning minutes to weeks. For example, if today a cell is specialized for a specific task, 
tomorrow it might be dedicated to a different one (Rule & al., 2019). This neuronal reorganization is 
known as ‘representational drift’ and further complicates our understanding of the brain’s activity. It 
causes neuronal representations to change with time challenging classical notions of engrams. Classical 
models of memory consider the stability of the engram as the basis for the persistence of memory. If all 
mnemonic cerebral configurations change over a time scale of few days how can a memory persist over 
much longer periods? 
Last but not least, the search for engrams resorts mostly on the correlation between the memory 
evaluation based on fear conditioning behavioral tasks of rodents and its presumed associated neural 
changes. It turns out that almost all findings based on fear conditioning are vitiated by inadequate sample 
sizes, leading to questionable statistical correlations, which represent only weak evidence but then, 
contrary to the math, are presented as strong evidence for the hypothesis tested (Carneiro & al., 2018). 
This, again, shows how, even among trained scientists, the correlation-causation fallacy is always 
lurking around the corner, especially when one isn’t aware of one’s own confirmation bias. 
However it is, the search for the neural engram will continue, as what else could we look for? The 
physicalists can’t consider alternatives such as an ‘extracorporeal information storage’ (for a review of 
this point, see (Forsdyke, 2015)). 
The fact that McConnel’s findings were ignored for more than half a century should tell us 
something. And, despite the potentially interesting implications for consciousness studies, the 
groundbreaking findings of Lorber regarding hydrocephalic patients in the 1980s or those of Shewmoon 
regarding congenitally decorticate children around the turn of the millennium remained isolated 
initiatives that did not lead to further investigations. 
III. Cognition without a brain 
We don’t think of plants as having any form of cognition or ability to learn or make decisions, let 
alone have a subjective conscious experience. 
Yet, already in 1867, the Italian botanist Federico Delfino concluded from his studies that denying 
intelligence to plants is “a serious mistake, born of a superficial appreciation of the facts” (Mancuso, 
2010). In 1889, no less than Charles Darwin and his son studied the movements of plants (Darwin & 
Darwin, 1898) and compared the plant’s roots to some sort of primitive brain, an idea that has become 
known as the ‘root-brain hypothesis.’ However, Darwin’s authority wasn’t enough to pave the way for 
further investigations and his insights were almost forgotten. 
The Indian scientist Jagadish Chandra Bose, in 1926, wrote about “The Nervous Mechanism of 
Plants” and was the first to conduct experiments which led him to conjecture about similarities between 
the nervous systems of animals and the signaling paths in plants (Bose, 1926). The scientific community 
valued his discoveries, but the times were not ripe to allow him to go too far with the neurobiological 
analogy. 
Nevertheless, about eight decades later a mounting scientific evidence from plant biology 
demonstrates how vegetal life shows elements of cognitive behavior that were not suspected or just 
considered impossible. At the turn of the millennium, terms like ‘plant neurobiology‘ appeared in the 
scientific literature in line with Bose’s understanding, drawing parallels between the complex 
information processing and signaling system in plants with the animal’s neuronal activity (Brenner & 
al., 2006). Because, as is well known, plants do not possess neurons, this implicitly self-contradictory 
terminology, rightly, sparked some controversy. However, setting aside debates about the nomenclature, 
recent findings fly in the face of the brain-centric belief system that there can’t be any form of cognition 
without a brain. 
One finding that met with considerable attention was the discovery that at least some plant species 
can learn by association–that is, the ability to understand that there is a relationship between two stimuli. 
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The classical associative learning example is the famous Pavlov’s dog experiment. A dog was trained 
to associate the sound of a bell with the receipt of food. Even before the dog saw the food, it began to 
salivate.  
A similar experiment was done with plants by a group led by senior research fellow in plant behavior 
at the University of Sydney, Monica Gagliano. In this case, the bell and food were replaced by a fan’s 
airflow and blue light, respectively. It was shown that garden pea seedlings (Pisum sativum) change 
their foraging behavior if trained to associate a running fan with a light source shining an hour later after 
the fan’s operation (Gagliano & al., 2016). They associated the fan and light stimuli and, once trained, 
‘learned’ to ‘predict’ that the fan was announcing that a light source would have been turned on in a 
specific location. Like Pavlov’s dog, which associated the bell with the arrival of food, plants also 
associate the fan with the appearance of light. 
Another example that raises important questions about the predictive abilities of plants and how they 
perceive the environment was an experiment that analyzed the goal-directed movements of the same 
pea plants that Gagliano used. Research led by Silvia Guerra and Umberto Castiello of the University 
of Padua, Italy, showed that the climbing plant searching for a support to attach to exhibited an 
anticipatory prehensile mechanism and that it was able to plan its movements before having any physical 
contact with the support (Guerra et al., 2019). Everything indicates the presence of motor planning and 
an ‘approach-to-grasp’ behavior. The experimenters also tested how smart the plant was in detecting a 
‘fake stimulus’ by replacing the real wooden pole with a 2D stimulus — that is, a photograph of it. Then, 
a similar behavior as that of the no-stimulus situation was observed. This experiment shows the plant’s 
ability to purposefully plan its behavior by grasping and opening its tendrils before having any physical 
contact with the support–that is, it does not flutter randomly throughout the environment until it bumps 
into something on which to grab. The plant seems to literally ‘see’ the support. Another experiment 
showed how the Boquila trifoliolata, a plant native to temperate forests of central and southern Chile 
and Argentina, is capable of flexible leaf mimicry (White & Yamashita, 2021).  It mimics the form of 
the leaves of a nearby artificial vine plant. Indeed, plants also possess photo-receptors called ‘ocelli’ 
which, however, do not form an image. What kind of mechanism stands behind this ‘plant vision’ 
remains unanswered. 
These were only some examples of the recent findings. There is extensive literature now that, 
especially in the last decade, has consistently shown how plants change behavior and adapt, respond 
predictively, possess some form of memory, resort to air and underground communication systems 
based on chemical, visual, and acoustic signals, have learning abilities and can evaluate their 
surroundings, make decisions, and even have a social life and cooperate (for a not-too-long review, see 
(Trewavas, 2017).)  
This is what people mean by ‘plant intelligence’ that should, of course, not be confused with animal 
or human intelligence. But it isn’t inappropriate to speak openly of a ‘minimal’ or ‘proto-cognition’ of 
plants, what scientists call a ‘basal cognition’ (for a modern review of this elusive concept see (Lyon & 
al., 2021).)  
The decisive point is that facts show how plants display complex behaviors and decision-making 
abilities that were previously thought to be impossible for an organism without a brain. A growing body 
of literature makes it increasingly difficult to maintain the orthodox belief system that would like to 
reduce organisms without a central nervous system to biochemical mechanistic adaptive processes alone 
and that cognitive processes necessarily need a neural substrate. 
Several experiments with unicellular creatures have made it clear that conditioned behavior in single 
cells exist as well and is comparable in its complexity to that of plants. 
An example of an interesting finding in this sense could be the evidence of conditioned behavior in 
amoebae. It could be shown how the motility pattern of the Amoeba proteus under the influence of the 
two stimuli is consistent with associative conditioned behavior (De la Fuente et al., 2019). It can 
associate an anode’s positive electric polarity with the presence of food, as in the pea plant the fan with 
the light or with Pavlov’s dog the bell announcing the arrival of food. Simple unicellular organisms can 
link past events and act according to what they remember, even acting against their own innate tendency. 
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Another quite surprising behavior was (re-)discovered 
recently in another protozoan. In 1906, the American 
zoologist Herbert Spencer Jennings noted how the Stentor 
roeselii could escalate actions to avoid an irritant stimulus. 
Stentor roeselii is a free-living protozoan, a trumpet-shaped 
ciliate species — with hair-like organelles–the cilia–which 
allow it to swim and sweep food into its ‘mouth.’ Jennings’ 
observations are illustrated in Fig. 6. The S. roeselii bends 
away its body if exposed to an irritant powder. If the 
irritant stimulus persists, its next strategy is to put its 
cilia in motion in an attempt to expel the powder 
particles. If this doesn’t help, it contracts down to its 
holdfast (a root-like structure anchoring it to the substrate). Finally, if still nothing helps, it detaches 
from the holdfast and swims away. 
This is not just a mechanical and reactive behavior. It is a complex hierarchy of avoidance behaviors 
in which the protozoan first enacts a strategy, sees if it works, and if not, resorts to another strategy in a 
series of attempts to solve a problem. 
 One hundred and thirteen years later, in 2019, Jennings’ observations were finally confirmed by a 
group at Harvard Medical School (Dexter et al., 2019). Indeed, this unicellular organism can modulate 
its behavior about how to respond to the environment in an escalation of actions that, to date, represent 
the most complex behavior known for a single (brainless) cell.  
 Another quite remarkable example one could present about cellular 
cognition is that of the abilities of the Physarum polycephalum, a large 
amoeba-like slime mold plasmodium — a fungal cytoplasm containing 
several nuclei but enclosed in a single membrane — that can be considered 
as a single giant cell. It changes its shape as it crawls in search of food as 
a yellow network of tube-like structures that grow a few centimeters per 
hour and whose movement can be captured via time-lapse recordings.  
This slime mold has several skills and behavioral patterns that could be 
labeled as ‘proto-intelligent’ and that one would hardly associate with such 
a primitive creature. For example, it can find the minimum length 
between two points in a labyrinth. When P. polycephalum is grown in 
a maze with nutrients at two spots, it first invades the entire labyrinth 
until it finds its food. Then, it retracts its pseudopods, leaving only 
those corresponding to the shortest path connecting the two food 
sources intact (see Fig. 7) (Nakagaki et al., 2000). Further research showed that P. polycephalum could 
minimize the network path and complexity between multiple food sources (Nakagaki, 2004).  
Conditioned behavior was shown as well. When this plasmodium is exposed to a sequence of three drier 
and cooler life-threatening conditions at constant time intervals, it reduces its speed of growth or stops 
entirely for a while before starting to grow again after each pulse. Once conditioned, it learns to 
anticipate the arrival of the second and third shocks even if only the first pulse is administered and the 
other ones are not. This shows that this slime mold can memorize and learn to anticipate periodic events 
(Saigusa & al., 2008). P. polycephalum is also able to adjust to unfavorable circumstances (Boisseau et 
al., 2016). It was believed that this was something only neural networks could do — learning to ignore 
repeated negative stimuli. That is, a learning process of habituation took place. 
These brainless organisms not only possess remarkable associative memory and problem-solving 
skills but also exhibit some form of self-awareness. When it encounters a structure, such as a wall it has 
to go around, the two arms of the slime mold branch out around the wall; once they come together and 
touch one another, one of the arms retracts. This suggests that the slime mold knows itself to be the same 
unity — that is, it is self-aware of itself as a single organism. 
 What about the simplest life form, namely, bacteria? It has been shown that they can sense the 
environment, actively move within it, target food, avoid toxic substances, and meaningfully change their 
swimming direction. Most astonishing is their behavior when they come together and form a bacterial 
community which shows surprising problem-solving abilities. Bacteria communicate with each other 
and coordinate gene expression, which determines the collective behavior of the entire community. This 
Fig. 6 Hierarchy of responses to repeated stimulations. 
Credit: (Dexter et al., 2019).  
Fig. 7 P. polycephalum finds the 
shortest path in the maze connecting 
two agar spots (AG). Credit: 
(Nakagaki et al., 2000) 
15 
 
leads to a collaboration that allows the community to achieve a common goal. Analogous to P. 
polycephalum, bacteria’s collective intelligence becomes evident when they are confronted with 
relatively complex task-solving problems such as route-finding in mazes and fractals. Also bacteria 
successfully navigate a labyrinth by chemotaxis (Phan & al., 2020). Everything indicates that bacteria 
can develop collaborative problem-solving abilities. 
These were only a few examples of cognitive cellular behavior (for a review of cellular intelligence 
see (Gershman & al., 2021); for a review of bacteria’s behavior, see also (Lyon, 2015)) and that question 
our brain-centered view of cognitive functions. We are now assisting in a sort of renaissance of 
experiments that suggest how many intelligent actions can be performed without neuronal activity. 
Conclusion 
At this point, the question we would like to ponder first is: Given the above findings and new insights, 
is the dominant physicalist science in its present format, which conceives of mind and consciousness 
only as an epiphenomenon of the brain — that is, a science based on an exclusively neuronal paradigm 
— still tenable?  
The left column of the following table summarizes the findings discussed. The middle column 
furnishes the possible interpretations that could, in principle, save a material monistic paradigm, while 
the right column offers the opposite non-physicalist viewpoint. 
Lack of correlation between  
cognitive and physical impairment 
Physicalist’s 
speculations to save 
the appearances 
Non-physicalist’s 
speculations to save the 
appearances 




the two hemispheres 
prevent ‘self-splitting’. 
Selfhood is not a brain’s 
epiphenomenon. 




takes over the tasks of 
the missing one. 
Neural networks are only 
a ‘pre-processing 
substratum’ buffering 
information to a non-
physical mind. 
Hydrocephalus can be quite extreme without 
necessarily leading to mental impairment. 
See: Neuroplasticity. 
Brain tissue may not be 





impairment scales more 
with physical symptoms  
than with behavioral 
ones because mind is 
unphysical. 
Analytic reasoning skills are not affected by any kind 
of brain center stimulation (Penfield). 
Reason emerges due to 
whole-brain activity 
which remains 
unaffected by localized 
stimulation. 
The brain is mainly a 
sensory-motoric 
processor and a ‘physical 
mind’, not a the seat of 
analytic reason. 
The hypothesis of the cerebral cortex being the 
‘generator’ of conscious experience (qualia) is 
contradicted by research on congenitally decorticated 
children and non-mammalians. 
What do we know 
about what it is like to 
be a bird? 
The cerebral cortex 
mediates higher-
cognitive function, it 
does not generate them. 
Thalamus stimulation acts as a ‘gate of consciousness’, 
not as its ‘generator.’ 
The thalamus is a hub 
that ‘modulates’ 
consciousness; it does 
not ‘generate’  
consciousness.  
The thalamus is a hub 
that has nothing to do 
with consciousness. 
Uncorrelated cognitive to brain properties   
Brain size (nr. of neurons, mass, volume) does not 
correlate with cognitive skills.  
A minimal nr. of 
neurons is necessary, 
then size does not 
necessarily scale with 
intelligence. 
Brain size is  related 
mainly to motoric-
sensory and 
physiological tasks; and 
less to mental functions 
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which are taken up 
elsewhere. 
The brain’s complexity (connectivity, efficiency of 
information transfer) does not correlate with cognitive 
skills. 
 
The brain’s complexity 
is more than  
connectivity and 
information transfer. 
The brain’s complexity is 
specific to physical 
information processing 
and sensor-motor 
specialization and does 
not scale with conscious 
awareness. 
The brain anatomy of the genius (e.g. Einstein) does 
not differ from the average ordinary cerebral anatomy. 
Brain anatomy is not 
neural architecture 
which is what 
ultimately counts. 
The genius of Einstein 
resided outside his brain. 
No engram cells found, no memory loss observed in 
hydrocephalus or hemispherectomy. 
It is only a matter of 
time before we will 
discover the engram 
cells. 
Memory is not in the 
brain. 
Wholistic shift   
The whole central nervous system (brain + spinal cord 
+ enteric/gut-brain axis) shape feelings and thoughts but 
no generating center can be identified. 
The brain remains the 
central organ ‘creating’ 
mind and 
consciousness with all 
other organs and 
physiological processes 
subservient. 
The extension of the 
nervous system beyond 
the brain is a physical 
manifestation of 
something extending 
beyond the body. 
The intensity of psychedelic altered states of 
consciousness inversely scale with network disruption.  
Wrong. It switches 
from default mode 
network to dorsal 
attention network. 
Reducing brain’s activity 
allows consciousness to 
‘shine through’. 
Non-neural based cognition   
Basal cognition of plants and cells. Will sooner or later be 




Consciousness and mind 
are fundamental, they 
use but don’t require a 
material basis.  
Thus, each of the cited neurological facts, when considered separately, may still be saved by several 
speculations inside the limitations dictated by material monism. But, in our view, they look increasingly 
contrived and difficult to support once one realizes that they are based on a priori suppositions that 
appeal to a widely held causation-correlation consensus fallacy. 
If, instead, we see things comprehensively in a wider context–that is, without selectively limiting our 
attention to the single phenomenon seen in isolation–by taking a coherent integral view in which each 
phenomenon is seen as the expression of an underlying deeper reality, these substantiate an ontology in 
which mind and consciousness are not an epiphenomenon of matter but, rather, ‘primal-phenomena’ 
that manifest through the material substrate, in line with a dualistic or idealistic or other non-physicalist 
worldview (e.g. the brain seen as a communication channel al la A. Huxley’s ‘reducing valve’ of a Mind 
at large or W. James’ ‘light prism’ analogy). 
At any rate, there is no doubt that neuroscience, especially in the last three or four decades, has made 
enormous progress. However, the uncritical acceptance of the (more or less unaware and metaphysical) 
neuronal premise, particularly that of the identity between neural activity and mind or consciousness 
being an undeniable given datum, is questionable. A too self-assured mind-brain monism rebuttal of 
dualistic or idealistic mind-body interpretations turns out to be not only based on a causation-correlation 
fallacy but also challenged by several modern findings which at least ask for clarification. This too one-
sided philosophical approach of the contemporary philosophy of mind, instead of leading us closer to 
the solution, only deepened the mystery. The mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness 
remain a controversial issue more than ever and non-physical ontologies of mind and consciousness are 
far from having been expunged by science. They will remain a viable option not despite but, to the 
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contrary, because of neuroscientific evidence which has been selectively dismissed for too long but 
cannot be ignored forever. 
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